# 1AC 3.0 LCC

## Contention 1: The Borderlands

We begin this debate with Gloria Anzaldua’s “To live in the borderlands means you”

To live in the Borderlands means knowing  
     that the *india* in you, betrayed for 500 years,  
     is no longer speaking to you,  
     that *mexicanas*call you *rajetas*,  
     that denying the Anglo inside you  
     is as bad as having denied the Indian or Black;  
  
*Cuando vives in la frontera(when you live on the border)*  
     people walk through you, the wind steals your voice,  
     you’re a *burra, buey*, scapegoat,  
     forerunner of a new race,  
     half and half—both woman and man, neither—  
     a new gender;  
  
To live in the Borderlands means to  
     put *chile* in the borscht,  
     eat whole wheat tortillas,  
     speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent;  
     be stopped by *la migra* at the border checkpoints;  
  
Living in the Borderlands means you fight hard to  
     resist the gold elixir beckoning from the bottle,  
     the pull of the gun barrel,  
     the rope crushing the hollow of your throat;  
  
In the Borderlands  
     you are the battleground  
     where enemies are kin to each other;  
     you are at home, a stranger,  
     the border disputes have been settled  
     the volley of shots have shattered the truce  
     you are wounded, lost in action  
     dead, fighting back;  
  
To live in the Borderlands means  
     the mill with the razor white teeth wants to shred off   
     your olive-red skin, crush out the kernel, your heart  
     pound you pinch you roll you out  
     smelling like white bread but dead;  
  
To survive the Borderlands  
     you must live *sin fronteras*  
     be a crossroads.

#### Gloria Anzaldua gets to the root understanding of the Border. Borders are the forefront of all imperial control. Borders did not just arise with the creation of earth. Eurocentric notions of the world dictated that great powers would have access to the most enriching parts of the land. This creation of the border is the root cause of all violence between nation states.

O Tuathail 96’(Gearoid, Associate Professor of Geography at VT and Professor of Government and International Affairs, Critical Geopolitics p.1-2)

Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space. In 16th century Europe, the centralizing states of the “new monarchs” began organizing space around an intensified principle of royal absolutism. In regions both within and beyond the nominal domain of the Crown, the power of royal authority over space was extended and deepened by newly powerful court bureaucracies and armies. The results in many instances were often violent, as the jurisdictional ambitions of total authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. Within the context of this struggle, the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name “geography” in the early modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. To the opponents of the expansionist court, “geography was a foreign imposition, a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along the lines established by royal authority. Geography was not something already posses by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests. More than five hundred years later, this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the on hand, and rebellious margins and dissident cultures, on the other hand, is still with us. While almost all of the land of the earth has now been territorialized by states, the process by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested. From Chechnya to Chiapas and from Rondonia to Kurdistann and East Timor, the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the contradictions of marginalized peoples and nations. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement. Indeed, the rise in absolute number of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place. In 1993 The United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees estimated that roughly 1 in every 130 people on earth has been forced into flight because of war and state persecution. In 1970 there were 2.5 million refugees in the world; today that figure is well over 18.2 million. In addition an estimated 24 million people are internally displaced within their own states because of conflict. More recently, genocide in Rwanda left over 500,000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refuges from that state into surrounding states. Refugees continue to be generated by “ethnic cleansing” campaigns in the Balkans; economic collapse in Cuba; ethnic wars in the Caucus; state repression in Guatemala, Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan; and xenophobic terror in many other states. Struggles over the ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics.

#### Specifically the border separating the United States and Mexico is a construction of racism – as Anzaldua describes it “you must live on the border to be the border” – the border politics are the root cause of all gendered and racial stereotypes created by the border.

Elvia R. **Arriola 2000** (B.A., California State University, Los Angeles J.D., University of California, Berkeley M.A., New York University, Professor Arriola joined NIU Law in 2001 and teaches Constitutional Law, Gender, Sexuality and the Law, Civil Rights Litigation, Family Law and a research and writing seminar, Women, Law and the Global Economy. She is a Women's Studies Faculty Associate. “VOICES FROM THE BARBED WIRES OF DESPAIR: WOMEN IN THE MAQUILADORAS, LATINA CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY, AND GENDER AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER” 49 DePaul L. Rev. 729 1999-2000 (<http://heinonline.org>)

I have previously argued that narratives and stories, even those gleaned from popular culture, can humanize the law, that is, flesh out its impact on people's lives. 10 1 In the context of exploring the breadth of the social injustices at the U.S.-Mexico border, which teems with opportunities for a better life as well as for the high risks of death at the hands of United States agents, storytelling is crucial.102 Arguably, taking on the subject of the border as a whole by deconstructing the interrelationship between routine border patrol enforcement, which appears mostly to impact male migrants, and the transnational relocation of American companies who will mostly employ Latinas, is not possible. It will either be too much or too little in my effort to grasp fully the interrelationships between life, labor, and law on both sides of the border. In fact, taking on such a project feels like a transgressive act, one that violates the intellectual or political borders discouraging me from centralizing the experiences of Mexican citizens while I presume to analyze the impact of American law and policy.103 But for a critical legal theorist, this is a worthy transgressive act. Undoubtedly, to open the door to the study of the border is to invite an overwhelming sense of defeatism. This is the daunting task of deconstructing all of what is embedded in the casual mention of "life on the border." To residents of the Southwest, the short phrase means so much, although its interpretation will obviously vary depending upon the person's own identity. Among the dominant classes, for example, including Anglo-whites and assimilated Mexican-Americans, or other non-Mexicans, the reference evokes images of the opportunities for cheap imported products and a high return on the American dollar for resorts, hotels, liquor, and weekend getaways. At one time an American's crossing into Mexico also meant the quick abortion one could not obtain in the United States or even a quick divorce. 10 4 But, a look at the border from a human rights or social justice standpoint triggers a more complex picture. Many are able to ignore it because a host of common stereotypes effectively dehumanize the identity of the border resident/Mexican citizen into faceless "illegals,"' 0 1 5 "dumb Mexicans,"'1 6 "wets" '10 7 or "wetbacks," and "difficult to train Mexican maids."' 08 Yet, underlying these stereotypes are the voices of persons whose human needs and despair intersect with socio-economic problems that are vast, originating as they do in seemingly uncontrollable phenomena such as the culture of poverty,10 9 legitimized corporate profiteering through the use of cheap foreign labor, and environmental abuse. The problems are compounded by limited or uncoordinated bi-governmental oversight of the corporate activities that give rise to the occupational and environmental hazards, either because of incomplete restraints or loopholes in immigration regulations,t" 0 trade agreements like NAFTA," 1 or lax enforcement of labor policies under Mexican law. 112 The **researcher of life on the border must also confront the prevailing attitude that whatever happens on the other side is of no concern to Americans, no matter how bad the problem.**113 I would argue, however, that **some issues involving the U.S.-Mexico border cannot be ignored** by the socially progressive theorist. For some people, life on the border is a constant skirting of the edges of death. Exposure to life-threatening working conditions or inhaled production chemicals are a problem.' 14 At the very least, this is an issue of human rights or environmental racism. As the workforce in these American owned maquiladoras is highly feminized, the issue of women's treatment should evoke the concerns of the feminist theorist. As the women in *maquiladoras* are mostly Mexicanas or from Central and South America, their treatment is a concern for the Latina critical legal theorist. The question then is what is the appropriate response and how does one analyze the social justice issues of "life on the U.S.-Mexico border," with a rational and manageable approach capable of producing recommendable solutions either in law or public policy?

The consequential nature of coloniality breeds binaries of exclusion that perpetrate the worst forms of oppression.

Grosfoguel (Associate Professor Ethnic Studies Department, Chicano/Latino Studies) 11

(Ramón. "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality." TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1, 4-6) //DDI13

What arrived in the Americas was a broader and wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the world-system is unable to account for. From the structural location of an indigenous woman in the Americas, what arrived was a more complex world-system than what political-economy paradigms and world-system analysis portrait. A European/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/ male arrived in the Americas and established simultaneously in time and space several entangled global hierarchies that for purposes of clarity in this exposition I will list below as if they were separate from each other: 1) a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labor (slavery, semi-serfdom, wage labor, petty-commodity production, etc.) are going to coexist and be organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market; 2) an international division of labor of core and periphery where capital organized labor in the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms (Wallerstein 1974); 3) an inter-state system of politico-military organizations controlled by European males and institutionalized in colonial administrations (Wallerstein 1979); 4) a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileges European people over non- European people (Quijano 1993; 2000); 5) a global gender hierarchy that privileges males over females and European Judeo-Christian patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (Spivak 1988; Enloe 1990); 6) a sexual hierarchy that privileges heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians (it is important to remember that most indigenous peoples in the Americas did not consider sexuality among males a pathological behavior and had no homophobic ideology); 7) a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christian/non-Western spiritualities institutionalized in the globalization of the Christian (Catholic and later, Protestant) church; 8) an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalized in the global university system (Mignolo 1995, 2000; Quijano 1991); 9) a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages that privileges communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and subalternize the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not of knowledge/theory (Mignolo 2000); 10) an aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naïve or primitive art where the West is considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of inferior expressions of art institutionalized in Museums, Art Galleries and global art markets; 11) a pedagogical hierarchy where the Cartesian western forms of pedagogy are considered superior over non-Westerm concepts and practices of pedagogy; 12) a media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means of global media production and information technology while the non-West do not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media networks; 13) an age hierarchy where the Western conception of productive life (ages between 15 and 65 years old) making disposable people above 65 years old are considered superior over non-Western forms of age classification, where the older the person, the more authority and respect he/she receives from the community; 14) an ecological hierarchy where the Western conceptions of “nature” (as an object that is a means towards an end) with its destruction of life (human and nonhuman) is privileged and considered superior over non-Western conceptions of the “ecology” such as Pachamama, Tawhid, or Tao (ecology or cosmos as subject that is an end in itself), which considers in its rationality the reproduction of life; 15) a spatial hierarchy that privileges the urban over the rural with the consequent destruction of rural communities, peasants and agrarian production at the worldscale.

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should open the US-Mexico border with the United Mexican States.

## Contention 2: Solvency

#### Open Borders would solve the racial inequality being caused by the current system, and could serve as a stepping stone to other forms of equality

Johnson 2007 Dean of UC Davis School of Law(Kevin R., 2007“Opening the Floodgates; Why America Needs to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws”)

Border enforcement could focus on the true dangers to U.S. society, rather than the exclusion of hardworking people simply seeking to better their lives in pursuit of the American Dream. The immigration laws would thus stand to better protect national security and public safety than the current ones do. The current system is woefully inadequate at basic tracking of the noncitizen population. The United States, by ensuring the legal entry of most noncitizens, would have a much better record than it currently does of who in fact is entering the country and where they live once here, furthering the important goal of protecting public safety and national security. Millions of noncitizens would not be living in the shadows of American society, outside the purview of law enforcement and the protections of the law, as they are today.¶ With immigrants’ fear of removal reduced significantly, exploitation of undocumented immigrants in the workplace might well decline on its own accord. Employers would not hold the strong lever of undocumented status over these immigrants, which often allows employers to dictate the terms of the employment relationship to workers. However, better enforcement of basic labor and employment law would presumably still be necessary. Governmental resources could be redirected from¶ ￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼ ¶ wasteful border enforcement efforts to enforcing basic workplace protections for all workers. Removing the stigma of “illegal” immigration status thus would benefit all workers. In no small part, this would happen because the current dual labor market—one regulated by law and the other that is not—that exists today would be dismantled, thus creating the opportunity for regulation of the workplace of all workers.¶ Legal avenues for immigrating to the United States would replace illegal means of entry. Open borders thus hold the promise of drastically reducing deaths on the border, an everyday occurrence in contemporary times. They would also reduce the current racial discrimination that plagues immigration enforcement in the United States and seeps into all aspects of American social life. Human trafficking would be reduced, as would the criminal element engaged in the deadly, exploitative, and downright horrifying trade in human beings.¶ In essence, open borders would go far to clean up the inequality and injustice that are perpetrated by the current U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement.¶

#### **The 1AC’s criticism of borders opens up a new reconceptualization of the way the border is viewed –this framework reinvents the notion of identity to the Hispanic body.**

Ortiz ’12 (Roxana, PhD in Literary Theory and Comparative Literature from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain, “De-constructing the border: Maternal language interdiction (and it is literary representation)”, <http://roxanarodriguezortiz.com/2012/03/21/de-constructing-the-border-maternal-language-interdiction-and-it-is-literary-representation/>)

As I have tried to argue, research at the border brings forth a new debate on theories and paradigms. On a specific geographical setting such as the border different theories interplay. It is important to set precedence on research done so far at the US-Mexican border so we can juxtapose different assessments and disciplines in order to understand present reality as well as deconstruct the dominant discourse; we can avoid, in this manner, historical racism or the advancement of a homogeneous monocultural process at the border. In this sense it is important to rethink the concept of borders so as to speak of our limitations and from here restructure the notions that have permeated contemporary research into border (whatever these may be). From this perspective it is important to develop new models and concepts so that they can, on one side, guide future actions and policies towards the border population and, on the other, allow us an epistemological approach within and from the border and into their own process of cultural and identity conformation.

Mexico would say yes – a reconceptualization between both nations about the nature of the border are key.

Johnson 07 (Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Davis. “Opening the Floodgates”, pg. 195, BW)

From 2001 to the present, the governments of Mexico and the United States have had ongoing discussions about migration, a major issue of interest to the two governments.126 For the Mexican government, ending human rights abuses and ensuring the continued flows of remittances from migrants in the United States to Mexico127 make U.S. immigration law relevant to its own national interests. Neither are served by border enforcement-only reforms. For well over a decade, however, U.S. lawmakers have failed to enact little more than laws that increase border enforcement. A much-needed reconceptualization of the meaning and nature of the U.S.-Mexico border stands to benefit both nations.128 An immigration scheme consistent with the economic, political, and social needs of the two nations, as has been outlined here, could be constructed. A more realistic legal regime would remedy the problems that plague immigration enforcement today and avoid repetitions of the mistakes of the past.

#### Therefore debate is an essential activity because it shapes our knowledge about the world and how to interact with it. Power shapes everything we do, and criticism is necessary to create spaces for agency, and new forms of knowledge production.

Giroux ‘6 (Henry A. Giroux, 11-2-06, Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism, <http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/node/25904>)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that our responsibility as intellectuals for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues. Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170). Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.   Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that education is already a space of politics, power, and authority. At the same time, they can make visible their opposition to those approaches to pedagogy that reduce it to a set of skills to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.

#### The 1AC creates a construction of new vocabulary that is compatible with our movement – caring for the self allows us to be complicit with the experiences of the world that hidden.

Scott 9 – prof of philosophy @ Vanderbilt

(Charles, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34: 350–367, Foucault, Genealogy, Ethics)

In Foucault’s analysis of the May 1968 uprising in France, he said that even though “things were coming apart” there did not “exist any vocabulary capable of expressing that process” (Foucault, 2000, 271). We could say on Foucault’s terms that there did not exist a way of knowing (a subject of knowledge) and the language and concepts suited for the complex event of France’s transformation. A momentous event happened without adequate “tools” for its recognition, analysis, and appropriation. Consequently, in the following dispersion of quarreling groups and political factions, the 1968 crisis did not at first become an effective discursive event that opened up a full range of apparent problems and transformations for formal knowledge. That would require a knowing subject that was turned away from the strongest discursive options, such as those of the current Humanists, Marxists, Maoists, French colonialists, and French cultural supremacists. So much was falling apart in France at the time that a subject of knowledge was needed that formed in the interconnecting French crises, a subject informed by marginal experiences in comparison to the experiences recognized by the dominant discourses, marginalized experiences like those of Algerian soldiers, French prisoners, people oppressed by French colonialism, people hammered down by Stalin’s communism or the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, and people in highly energized, non-French cultures: a subject that developed with the voices and experiences that were on the margins of the older and authoritative French way of life.¶ In spite of the stammering and stumbling in its aftermath, however, May, 1968 opened an opportunity for a new “vocabulary,” a new discourse, and a new ethos for recognizing and knowing. Its event made possible a transitional and transformative knowing subject whose relative freedom and lack of establishment constituted a major, constructive epistemic difference from the accepted discourses. Much more could be said on this issue, but my present, limited points are that in the context of Foucault’s thought, transformation of the knowing subject constitutes an ethical event; and ethics on an individual level takes place as people work on themselves to be able to change themselves enough to know differently and to transform what is evident about others (Foucault, 2000, 241–2).14 These two kinds of transformation take place in genealogical knowing as Foucault conceives and practices it.¶ Two different senses for ethics are at work here. One sense refers to ways of life that are constituted by discourses, institutions, and practices—by all manner of power formations that are not authored by singular individuals and that are ingrained in people’s lives inclusive of their judgment, knowledge, and codes of behavior. A society, of course, can have a variety of overlapping or competing ways of life, a variety of ethical environments, and changes in these environments would compose ethical changes in this broad sense of “ethical.” The knowledge that genealogy generates comprises a different discourse from many established ones and puts in question many aspects of Western society, especially around the topics of madness, sex, crime, normalcy, social/political suppression of people, and mechanisms of regulation and control. It challenges significant parts of our social environment, encourages deliberation and critique, and intends to make a differential impact on contemporary ways of life. In addition to his writing, Foucault was active in many causes designed to change political and social formations and to have a broad social impact. He played a leading role, for example, in support of Vietnamese boat people who were fleeing from persecution and being ignored by Western governments. He was active in prison reform movements. He spoke out against what he found to be unacceptable injustices in Poland and equally unacceptable silence in their regard in the West, against a Realpolitik that ignores suppression of people and their liberties in countries other than one’s own. He showed in multiple ways that passionate support of institutional transformation and of suppressed and suffering people can be carried out without Humanism or other forms of universalizing or totalizing discourse.¶ A second sense of ethics for Foucault means a work on the self by the self.15 He understood, for example, his writing (and his interviews) as processes of self-formation: “I haven’t written a single book that was not inspired, at least in part, by a direct personal experience,” an experience that he wants to understand better by finding a different vocabulary, changed combinations of concepts, and the mutations they bring by connecting with aspects of experience that are barely emerging at the borders of his awareness (Foucault, 2000, 244). His books, he says, compose experiences inclusive of his own “metamorphosis” as he writes them and comes to a transformed connection with their topics. He would also like for his books to provide readers with something akin to his experience, to bring us to our limits of sense where transformations can occur (Foucault, 2000, 244). The sense of ethics in this case is focused by individual experiences and the care they exercise in connecting with them. In care for themselves, they work at maintaining or altering their behavior and attitudes to appropriate themselves to their experiences.16 Foucault says that his books are “like invitations and public gestures” to join in the book’s process, a process that he finds transformative of aspects of contemporary life and potentially, should individuals join in, transformative of the way they understand and connect with themselves (Foucault, 2000, 245–6).¶ Care for self has a very long lineage that Foucault spent his last years investigating. Indeed, understanding himself without metaphysical help or universalized solutions was one aspect of his caring self-relation. He carried out a project, deeply rooted in a Western tradition that makes caring for oneself inseparable from the ways one knows oneself, the world, and others. In his own process, he finds repeated instances of change in his self-world relation as he experiences the impact of what he is coming to know at the borders of his knowledge and identity. When these boundary-experiences (he calls them limit-experiences) occur, he says, the clarity of some aspects of his identity dies in the impact of what he is coming to find. His affections and behavior often change. As an author he attempts to write into his books these very processes for the reader’s possible engagement.¶ If I find through one of his books, for example, a way of knowing that makes clear some of the dangers inherent in a well-established body of knowledge or a mainstream institution, I have an opportunity for assessing those dangers and choosing how I will connect with them and my experience of them. I might find that what I know and the way I know are violated by what Foucault’s work shows. I might find his approach and the knowledge that it offers highly questionable or irrelevant for my life. I might experience new questions, a need for change, an unexpected dissatisfaction with what I have been accepting as true and good. If Foucault’s works carry out their intention and if I read them carefully, I am engaged in an experience that he found transformative and that will make room for choices and problems that I can experience and that might bring me to an edge where what I know meets a limit and the possibility for an altered discourse and subjectivity. Coming in this way to an edge, a limit of the way I know and who I am in such knowing brings together the epistemic and personal aspects of ethical experience. The very act of caring for myself in this instance interrupts the subliminal processes of normalization and sets in motion another kind of dynamics as I come to the limits of my “authorized” experience and the emergence of a different kind of experience. I am caring for myself, impacting my own affections, values, and way of knowing. The dynamics of what Foucault calls biopower (the powerful complex of social forces that regulate human behavior by means of, for example, health care delivery, education, and moral legislation in both broad and “corpuscular” ways) are interrupted by a different dynamics that builds individual autonomy. Self-caring instead of the anonymous dynamics of normalization begins to form my self’s relation to itself. How will I appropriate the experience of limits and their transgression by emerging “voices”, realities, and intensities? Who shall I be in their impact? How will I present myself to myself and my environment should I affirm what is happening in the margins of my established identity?

## Contention 3: Framing

Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

## Extra Cards

#### We do not reject the state – using the state is key to epistemically change the mindset of the state – though notions of nuclear war and big stick impacts are predicated on an irrationality because there is an inherent improbability to the disad’s impact.

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This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.